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Abstract One way to make philosophy of science more socially relevant is to attend
to specific scientific practises that affect society to a great extent. One such practise
is biomedical research. This paper looks at contemporary U.S. biomedical research
in particular and argues that it suffers from important epistemic, moral and socio-
economic failings. It then discusses and criticises existing approaches to improve on
the status quo, most prominently by Thomas Pogge (a political philosopher), Joseph
Stiglitz (a Nobel-prize winning economist) and James Robert Brown (a philosopher
of science). Finally, it sketches an alternative proposal and argues for its superiority.
The proposal has four components: changing the intellectual property regime; insti-
tuting independent clinical research; aligning innovators’ and patients’ interests; and
enacting additional regulation.
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1 Introduction
One way to make philosophy of science more socially relevant is to attend to spe-
cific scientific practises that affect society to a great extent. Some 40 or 50 years
ago, there was a neat division of labour between philosophers of science examining
the conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological aspects and historians and sociol-
ogists examining actual scientific practice in its institutional, historical, social, eco-
nomic, political and moral aspects. This division of labour has now largely been given
up, partly because the pursuit of the purely philosophical problem failed. There are
few conceptual, metaphysical or epistemological claims that are universally true, true
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independently of their historical and institutional context. If this is the case, it imme-
diately follows that philosophy must take that context into account if it still aims for
true or at least useful principles.
The practise I look at in some detail here is contemporary—mostly U.S.—
biomedical research. I will argue that biomedical research, as currently done, has
important, and interrelated, epistemic, moral and socio-economic failings. But these
have largely been ignored in the philosophy of science literature.1 The aim of this
paper is to partially redress the balance and make the organisation of biomedical re-
search a philosophy of science topic. In what follows, I will first motivate the topic
by arguing that the regulation of biomedical research is something philosophers of
science should worry about. I will then describe the status quo and the various ways in
which it is deficient. After that I will discuss critically proposals that have been made
to improve the situation and, finally, outline my own proposal.
2 Why philosophers of science should worry about how to reform biomedical
research
Some readers with a philosophy of science background may be sympathetic to the con-
cerns regarding biomedical research (BMR) voiced here but wonder why the problem
of how to organise research is their’s. Aren’t the metaphysical and epistemic dimen-
sions of science the subject of the philosophy of science, and aren’t there specialists—
such as bioethicists or medical ethicists—better qualified to deal with this issue? Let
me adduce five arguments to the effect that this way of thinking would be mistaken.
2.1 Institutional design has epistemic implications
Social epistemologists locate rationality and objectivity not in individuals, their
motives and causes of action, but rather in the institutions and procedures of knowl-
edge acquisition. In the words of one proponent (Kitcher 1993, 305): ‘particular kinds
of social arrangements make good epistemic use of the grubbiest motives’. Helen
Longino similarly argues that (Longino 1990, 74): ‘Objectivity… is a characteristic
of a community’s practice of science rather than of an individual’s, and the practice
of science is understood in a much broader sense than most discussions of the logic
of scientific method suggest’.
To the extent that philosophers of science aim to exert normative power over sci-
ence, they therefore have to assess the degree to which institutions in a given domain
are conducive to rational and objective inquiry. One way to do so is to assess the
institutions against an ideal such as Kitcher’s ‘well-ordered science’ (Kitcher 2001)
or Longino’s four criteria of objectivity—recognised avenues for criticism, shared
standards, community response and (tempered) equality of intellectual authority
(op. cit.; Longino 2002).
1 Notable exceptions include Adam (2008), Biddle (2007), Brown (2002, 2004, 2008), Kincaid and
McKitrick (2007), and Worrall (2002).
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Below, I will follow a different path and assess the output of BMR against the stan-
dards it sets itself. Partly this has to do with a contextualist perspective I am assuming.
I will introduce it next.
2.2 Philosophy of science without practise is impoverished
There is another reason for why philosophy of science must attend to scientific practise.
A number of philosophers have convincingly argued that there is no unique standard
of scientific rationality, valid independent of the historical details and the purpose of
the inquiry. To the contrary, scientific standards are valid, at best, locally and relative to
the given context in which the inquiry is made (e.g., Kincaid 2004; Cartwright 2006).
Without the context of specific queries, given by the researchers’ purposes, standards,
financial, technological and ethical constraints, assessments of the used methods will
be mere intellectual parlour games.
BMR, then, may act as a case study for such contextual philosophy of science inves-
tigations as much as any other practise. But there are additional reasons to believe that
this type of research lends itself particularly well to a study in ‘how to make philoso-
phy of science more socially relevant’. Unlike, say, those of many parts of theoretical
physics, the products of BMR are of immediate social value, and in many cases essen-
tial for people’s survival. Hence, and I will argue this in slightly more detail in a
moment, factual and normative issues are more tightly interwoven here than in other
areas, which makes them both harder but also more important to address. Experi-
mentation is both more ethically challenging as well as less informative than in other
domains. One aspect that characterises especially medical research is that there is no
‘grand theory’ such as Newton’s, Einstein’s or Darwin’s that drives investigations, a
reason that makes much of the theory-centred philosophy of science—positivist and
post-positivist—difficult to apply.
2.3 Ethical aspects cannot safely be ignored by philosophers of science
Another reason to attend to the details of scientific practise has to do with the collapse
of the fact/value dichotomy (Putnam 2002; see also Kincaid et al. 2007; Douglas, this
volume). According to defenders of the dichotomy, there is a realm of ‘facts’ that
exists separately from and uninfluenced by value judgements, has its own methods
of investigation and its own qualities (such as objectivity). Facts can influence value
judgements (for instance by the principle that if S cannot do X , S is under no obligation
to do X ) in a way that value judgements do not and should not influence the existence
of and judgements about facts.
One line of argument against the dichotomy maintains that facts cannot neatly be
separated from values because the very terms used in descriptions contain factual and
evaluative components (probably more so for ‘rape’, ‘cruel’ and ‘inflation’ than for
‘electron’, ‘spin’ and ‘red shift’). This is certainly true for much of BMR if for no other
reason than that ‘disease’ itself is a value-laden concept. Importantly, the factual and
evaluative aspects cannot be divorced in a way that would allow a division of labour
between methodologists and ethicists. Defining a disease and designing appropriate
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methods for diagnosis and therapy are often interdependent, for instance. Therefore,
focusing on the epistemic and metaphysical aspects and at the same time leaving the
moral aspects to bioethicists is not an option for the philosopher of science, at least
not in this area.
2.4 Philosophers of science are well positioned to contribute to improving BMR
The other side of the fact/value entanglement thesis is that normative judgements about
how to organise BMR shouldn’t be left to ethicists alone. The arguments that have been
levied against current BMR do not just target skewed research priorities (for instance,
by discriminating against diseases of ethnic minorities and the poor in the Western
world, or the diseases of the global poor) and other ethical aspects, they also find fault
with the more epistemic components of research, for instance, by pointing out that
certain methods are ill-suited to realise particular goals independently of whether or
not these goals are worth pursuing. Philosophers of science are (or should be) experts
in these epistemic and methodological questions and should therefore play a role in
designing epistemically and morally/socio-economically sound research institutions.
2.5 No-one else is doing it
A final reason for philosophers of science to engage with questions about the organi-
sation of BMR is that others, to the extent that the task is their’s, are simply not doing
their job. A recent article by Michael Selgelid describes the situation in bioethics
(Selgelid 2005, 273):
A situation analogous to the 10/90 divide in medical research [i.e., that 90% of
research funds are used to investigate diseases causing 10% of the global disease
burden] apparently holds true for research in bioethics. A quick flip through most
bioethics texts and journals (or a visit to any number of websites) reveals atten-
tion on abortion, euthanasia, assisted reproduction, genetics, and doctor-patient
relationships. To a large extent the issues examined one way or another involve
advanced technologies or expensive interventions available primarily in wealthy
developed nations. ‘Distribution of resources’ is a common topic; but discussion
here often (at least implicitly) concerns domestic allocation rather than issues of
international justice.
There are some attempts of political philosophers concerned about matters of interna-
tional justice to bring the problem to the fore, most notably in the writings of Thomas
Pogge (e.g., Pogge 2005),2 but these remain scattered and unsatisfactory (see below).
Relevant for the theme of this volume is a criticism I shall make below of these pro-
posals, viz. that they suffer from a lack of understanding of the science of producing
2 In a vein similar to Thomas Pogge, Mathias Risse also asks whether there is a human right to essential
pharmaceuticals. But he explicitly excludes questions about how to incentivise research into new treatments
for the poor (Risse, forthcoming, 629).
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medical treatments. I take it, then, that there are some at least prima facie good reasons
for philosophers of science to think about the organisation of BMR.
3 What’s wrong with biomedical research?
In this paper I will focus on (contemporary) BMR in the United States because (a) it
is highly significant (about half of the research dollars spent on BMR world wide are
spent in the U.S.3; (b) it is most intensely studied; and (c) to my knowledge, it is the
most highly biased with respect to criteria I use below.4 Let me also focus on the more
applied side of BMR, the one concerned with the production of treatment options for
patients. I assume that the goal of BMR, thus understood and described in the most
abstract terms, is to produce medical treatments that are both safe and effective at
providing genuine medical benefit.
This goal has three interrelated dimensions: epistemic, moral and socio-economic.
On the epistemic dimension, I ask whether the procedures and methods BMR imple-
ments are likely to generate the knowledge required for realising its goal. In particular,
I ask whether its procedures and methods make it likely that the safety and efficacy of
its products are known. On the moral dimension, I ask whether the research priorities
of BMR are adequate. On the socio-economic dimension, I ask whether the goal is
realised efficiently, measured both in terms of monetary costs as well as costs such as
those related to lost human and animal welfare. Let us consider each of these in turn.
3.1 Three dimensions of assessing biomedical practise
3.1.1 Epistemic failures
The U.S. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the FDA’s centre respon-
sible for, among other things, regulating and supervising the safety of medical drugs
and devices assesses whether the drugs pharmaceutical companies wish to market are
safe and effective for the intended use (Chow and Liu 2002). The main source of
evidence demonstrating that drugs are safe and effective are clinical trials. Indeed,
under ideal conditions, a clinical trial can be shown to prove causal conclusions—if
the conditions are met (Cartwright 2007). But apart from worries regarding ‘external
validity’, i.e., the continued holding of the claim outside the trial population, the con-
ditions under which many trials are conducted are far from the ideal, and for reasons
able to raise concerns in patients. There are three sources of worry: outcomes likely
to be biased; weakening standards; and suppression or delay of publishing results.
Biased outcomes. There has been a tendency for BMR to become more commer-
cialised over recent years, that is, profit-oriented companies have replaced academic
and other non-profit organisations in conducting medical research such as clinical
trials. For instance, in 1991, only 20% of industry money for clinical trials went to
3 Global Forum for Health Research (2004b, 20).
4 To the extent that I have been able to verify it, European BMR is similar in many respects but less extreme.
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commercial research units such as contract-research organisations (CROs) and site-
management organisations (SMOs); by 1998, the figure had risen to 60% (Getz 1999).
In 2003, CROs alone played a substantial role in 64% of phase 1, 2, and 3 clinical
studies, as compared with only 28% in 1993 (Shuchman 2007).5
Industry-sponsored research tends to have outcomes that are favourable for the
tested drug (Bekelman et al. 2003). This could of course be explained if drugs reached
trial stage only when there are very good reasons to believe that the drug is indeed
effective. But if results are compared between those financed by industry and those
by independent organisations, it turns out that there are differences. For instance,
Als-Nielsen et al. (2003) find in a study of 370 randomized drug trials included in
meta-analyses from Cochrane reviews that the experimental drug was recommended
as the treatment of choice in 16% of trials funded by nonprofit organizations, but in
51% of trials funded by for-profit organizations.
Weakened standards. The commercialisation of research has also weakened the
standards. Today, drugs are often tested on patients who are younger and more healthy
than the target population. As a consequence, effectiveness may be exaggerated and
side effects understated. Further, if the drug is tested against an existing product,
the latter is often administered in insufficient doses or inadequate ways, which again
makes the new drug appear more effective than it actually is. Moreover, more and more
community physicians who have no training in research are involved, for instance, in
the selection of patients (Bodenheimer 2000).
Suppressed and delayed publication.6 According to one study, ‘Substantial num-
bers of clinical trials are never reported in print, and among those that are, many are
not reported in sufficient detail to enable judgments to be made about the validity of
their results’ (Chalmers 1990, 1405). An unpublished report cannot be scrutinised by
the public. Another study found long delays in the publication of results (Blumenthal
et al. 1997). Especially when the research reveals side effects of already marketed
drugs, this can have severe adverse consequences. Justin Biddle reports findings to
the effect that Merck, the producer of Vioxx, mischaracterised the state of knowledge
regarding its possible cardiovascular side effects between 2000 and 2004 and reported
data on the drug inadequately (Biddle 2007). Moreover, it is becoming more frequent
that trials are run at multiple sites such that only the pharmaceutical company has
the whole set of data and can therefore control what is being analysed and published
(Bodenheimer 2000). Researchers working on individual sites cannot run adequate
tests as they have access only to subsets of the data and hence cannot publish results.
None of the points I summarised above establish that the drugs that have been
approved by the FDA are necessarily unsafe or ineffective or both. But they do
raise concerns about whether enough has been done to find out whether they are.
That is, they primarily raise epistemic concerns. Since drugs that are approved
can be marketed, moral and socio-economic consequences are immediate: an
unsafe drug ought not to reach patients and companies ought not to reap profits
5 On CMOs in the context of commercialised research, see also Mirowski and Van Horn (2005).
6 As Jacoline Bouvy pointed out to me, the FDA now requires certain trials to be registered with clinical-
trials.gov, and medical journals will only publish results of registered trials, which makes suppression and
delay of publication harder (albeit not impossible).
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Table 1 Relationship between research funding and global disease burden (GDB); financial data for 2001




% of total GDB R&D
funding/DALY
(U.S.$)
All 1,470 105, 900 100 72
HIV/AIDS + TB +
malaria
167 1, 400 11.4 8.4
CVD 148.19 9, 402 9.9 63.45
Diabetes 16.19 1, 653 1.1 102.07
Malaria 46.49 288 3.1 6.2
TB 34.74 378 2.3 10.88
Source: De Francisco and Matlin (2006, 90)
from them. This is just one example of how the epistemic, the moral and the socio-
economic interact. In the following subsections I will look at concerns that are pri-
marily moral and social-economic.
3.1.2 Moral failures
Choice of research projects is a traditional philosophy-of-science topic, which, always
to some and to a great extent in the context of BMR, has ethical ramifications. It is clear
that there are enormous inequalities in the global allocation of funds to research differ-
ent diseases. As Table 1 shows, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria
and tuberculosis, the sufferers of which live mostly in third-world countries, receive
only a fraction of the investment per share in the global disease burden as compared
to first-world afflictions such as cardiovascular disease and diabetes. To quote just one
figure, malaria, pneumonia, diarrhoea and tuberculosis together account for 21% of
the global disease burden as measured in DALYs,7 but receive only 0.31% of all pub-
lic and private funds devoted to health research (Global Forum for Health Research
2004a, 122).
Perhaps issues of global justice aren’t a concern for U.S. BMR.8 But U.S. patients’
needs do not seem to be served too well either.9 Many of the new drugs the FDA
approves target diseases that have the following properties (Angell 2004, 83ff.). They:
• are chronic, i.e., not curable, but treatable,
• are not lethal,
• affect wealthy people.
Examples include depression, diabetes, and high blood pressure. These are, however,
conditions for which there already exist very effective medical drugs or for which
7 DALYs are a measure of overall disease burden, combining mortality and morbidity. Each health state is
assigned a number between zero (complete health) and one (death), which is multiplied with the number
of years a person suffers from the disease or, in case of death, with the number of years the sufferer would
have lived had he or she been fully healthy.
8 Though they should be, see Reiss and Kitcher (2009).
9 This double negative effect—on both developing world as well as the United States—is also emphasised
by Joseph Stiglitz, see Stiglitz (2006a, Ch. 4).
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non-medical treatments such as exercise and diet often prove to be more effective
than medical treatments. For example, in a comparative trial on patients with a high
risk of developing diabetes, 29% in the placebo group, 22% in the treatment group,
but only 14% in a group that underwent a diet and exercise programme developed
the condition (ibid., 170). For a different example, in a study called ALLHAT (short
for Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial) a
generic diuretic turns out to be just as effective for lowering blood pressure as newer,
branded and therefore far more expensive drugs (ibid., 94ff.).
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies appear to invent diseases. In order to be able
to extend the patent life of Prozac, Eli Lilly renamed the drug and promoted it to treat
premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD), a condition previously not thought of as
in need for medical treatment. Erectile dysfunction, female sexual dysfunction and
social anxiety disorder are other prominent examples.10
3.1.3 Socio-economic failures
I now turn to the products of research. Contemporary U.S. BMR generates drugs
with questionable medical value and of unknown safety and effectiveness. To make
matters worse, the products are by and large not particularly innovative but all the
more expensive. This too is an area where the three dimensions interact. Expensive
healthcare makes access more difficult for poor people. And lack of innovation is as
much an epistemic failure as it is socio-economic.
Innovativeness. Despite the pharmaceutical industry’s claims to the contrary, it
would be hard to maintain that it is as innovative as it says. For instance, 1,284 new
drugs were approved by the FDA in the period 1990–2004. The FDA classified them
as follows:
• 289 (22.51%) constitute a ‘significant improvement compared to marketed prod-
ucts in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease’ (of these, 183 or
14.25% of the total were ‘new molecular entities’ and 106 or 8.26% of the total
were improved variations on existing drugs such as new formulations, new com-
binations or new manufacturers);
• 77.49% of the approved drugs were no better than existing drugs.11
This means that the overwhelming majority of ‘new’ drugs that do arrive in the market
are slight modifications of existing substances (and adjustments were introduced just
in order to be able to patent the entity), which have come to be known as ‘me-too’
drugs. Even if the me-too drug problem may sometimes be overstated,12 it is clear that
the industry is hardly as innovative as it claims it is.
10 For more on ‘disease mongering’ see Public Library of Science (2006).
11 http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/pstable.htm.
12 Detlef Niese, of Novartis, told me in personal conversation that whether a drug is effective or not often
depends on the exact details of its composition and it is very hard to find out what will work. Thus new
combinations or formulations of existing entities may be regarded as innovations even though they are not
new molecular entities.
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It is also notable that the FDA requires drugs to be tested only relative to placebos
(except in ethically highly problematic cases). This means that an FDA approval is, at
best, a signal that the approved drug is better than taking a sugar pill, not that it’s better
than an existing treatment. But as we will see, FDA approval means less than that.
Importantly, the research dollars spent on drugs that are no better than existing prod-
ucts could be spent on new treatments that have genuine medical value. The current
system therefore involves high social opportunity costs. Direct, non-economic costs
are created by animal and human testing of new drugs that have no benefit.
Exploding health costs. U.S. patients have to pay far more for their drugs than
consumers in comparable countries. Spending in the U.S. for prescription drugs
was $227.5 billion in 2007, more than five times the 1990 figure (which was $40.3
billion; see Kaiser Family Foundation 2008; Hartman et al. 2009). This was about $753
per capita in 2007. In the same year, Canadians spent some (U.S.) $538 per capita.13
The disparity between the two countries is even more extreme when one looks at the
total health administration costs. According to one study, U.S. citizens paid $1,059 on
health in 1999, as compared with $307 in Canada (Woolhandler et al. 2003, 768).14
3.2 Causes
The causes of the malaise of U.S. BMR are unlikely to be found in ignorance or dis-
agreement about the epistemic, moral and socio-economic matters that were described
above in the biomedical community. Plainly, a biomedical scientist does not need a
philosopher to tell her how to run a clinical trial. To be sure, there are some disagree-
ments about data interpretation—most notably between frequentists and Bayesians
(see for instance Mayo 1996 for the frequentist and Howson and Urbach 2005 for
the Bayesian perspective)—and about what clinical trials can and cannot achieve (see
for instance Worrall 2002), but most of the points made above are well known and
relatively uncontroversial among scientists. Perhaps not everyone will agree that U.S.
BMR should prioritise research into tropical diseases but global health inequalities
too are something Western biomedical practitioners increasingly worry about (for a
survey of issues and responses, see McGoey et al. forthcoming).
Nor, in my view, is the profit motive many see as the force driving the commerciali-
sation of research a factor that explains much. Greed is an epiphenomenon. People,
scientists and non-scientists, government- or industry-sponsored, simply respond to
incentives. And the incentives, whether material or non-material, are provided by the
structures and institutions within which research (or any other activity) is practised.
The appropriate place to look for the causes of the status quo are is therefore the
aspects of the regulation that have helped to create the current system.
Throughout, the health care legislation in the United States since 1980—described
by some as ‘watershed year’ for BMR (e.g. Angell 2004; Mirowski and Van Horn
13 Morgan et al. (2008, 10). The report quotes a figure of 577.70 Canadian Dollars, which I converted
into U.S. Dollars using an average exchange rate for 2007. Using an average was necessary because the
exchange rate is very volatile, ranging from 0.84 to 1.09 USD/CAD in 2007.
14 Though the exact figures are subject to doubt. See Aaron (2003).
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2005)—has been extremely business friendly, thus seldom acting with the patient’s
welfare in mind and doing violence to the production of scientific knowledge. Inade-
quate regulation—both the failure to regulate certain practises as well as the introduc-
tion of new regulations with adverse effects—has created a system in which everyone
seems to profit: companies and their stock holders by high sales and profit margins;
doctors, by gifts and financial contributions from the industry; academic researchers,
by the possibility to patent the fruits of their research; politicians, by board mem-
berships in the industry and campaign donations; regulators, by so-called ‘user-fees’,
paid for by the industry; and—apparently—patients, by an allegedly highly innova-
tive industry that is spending billions to find new treatments for their health problems.
We have already seen that these appearances deceive, at least as regards the patients’
welfare. Let us now examine more specifically the areas in which the industry seems
to be inadequately regulated.
3.2.1 Advertising and marketing
Spending on direct-to-customer (DTC) advertising by the U.S. pharmaceutical indus-
try shot up from $55 million in 1991 to over $2.5 billion in 2000 and 4.2 billion in
2005 (Rosenthal et al. 2002; Donohue et al. 2007). DTC advertising has at least two
adverse effects. First, it makes consumers believe they suffer from a condition that
can and should be treated by using a drug, a condition that otherwise would have
gone unnoticed and for which treatment would not have been required or for which
other forms of treatment are just as effective, if not more so (e.g., psychotherapy for
depression). Second, for a given condition or disease patients often request a particular
brand-name drug although a much cheaper and sometimes more effective and safer
generic version is available (Wilkes et al. 2000).
The bulk of the pharmaceutical companies’ spending on marketing, however, aims
to influence doctors’ prescription behaviour rather than the patients themselves. An
army of sales representatives is employed by the industry with budgets to give doc-
tors samples, pay for expensive lunches and dinners or other gifts. Sometimes doctors
charge fees for their time listening to a sales representative (Chin 2002). Billions of
dollars are spent on supporting medical congresses, meetings and continuing education
events (Moynihan 2003). Further, firms advertise their products in medical journals,
some of which depend on industry ads for their existence. The marketing and adver-
tising budgets as a percentage of sale in the industry average 34.9% over the decade
1990–2000 (Kreling et al. 2001, 45), as compared with an average share of between
10.9% (1990) and 13.7% (2000) of sales for R&D spending. Marketing and advertis-
ing therefore help to inflate health care costs and to divert resources away from those
with greatest needs to those with the largest willingness to pay.
3.2.2 Corruption
Nearly every type of player in U.S. BMR receives benefits, financial or in-kind, from
the pharmaceutical industry. Some examples include:
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• Doctors. 94% of U.S. physicians have been reported to profit from the pharma-
ceutical industry in one way or another (Campbell et al. 2007). One important
canal is the payment of ‘finder’s fees’ for community physicians who sign up
patients in clinical trials (see for instance Christensen and Orlowski 2005).
• The FDA. The pharmaceutical industry pays so-called user fees to the FDA for
expedited drug approval (Hilts 2003). Since 1992, the proportion of the federal
government’s contribution to FDA funding has been declining, while that pro-
vided by industry has risen steadily (Harris 2004). Today, more than half of the
employees of the FDA are dependent on user fees in the sense that their jobs
would not exist were it not for industry money (Angell 2004, 208–209). This
matters because the percentage of funding devoted to the approval of new drugs
has risen from 53% in 1992 to 79% in 2003, while the percentage of funding
devoted to surveying existing drugs has correspondingly declined (Harris 2004).
• Politicians. In 2002, the pharmaceutical industry employed 675 lobbyists in
Washington, which means more than one for each member of Congress and
nearly seven for each U.S. senator. Of these, 26 were former members of Con-
gress. Various politicians are former industry members (e.g., Donald Rumsfeld
used to be CEO, president and chairman of G. D. Searle; George Bush Sr. was on
the Eli Lilly board of directors). In the 1999–2000 election cycle, pharmaceutical
companies gave $20 million in direct campaign contributions plus $65 million
in soft money (Angell 2004, Ch. 11).
Failure to regulate these financial flows creates all three types of deficiencies. Stan-
dards for drug research and approval are watered down. Projects with dubious medical
but high expected commercial value are pursued. The costs of health care are inflated.
3.2.3 Commercialised research
Both basic as well as clinical research has become dramatically more commercia-
lised in the past 20 years.15 The Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act (both
1980) gave universities, small businesses and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
patent-control over their inventions stemming from government-funded research and
the ability to charge royalties to the pharmaceutical industry in exchange for licenses.
This has helped to create the boom in biotechnology start-up companies, but it has also
affected research done at universities. More and more academic researchers see them-
selves now as partners of industry rather than as pursuing some independent good.
There has also been a considerable brain drain from universities to small biotech firms
and other companies.
Clinical research has become more commercialised by the replacement of academic
medical centres with for-profit contract research and site maintenance organisations,
as mentioned above. To give additional figures, 71% of industry-sponsored clinical
trials were outsourced to academic medical centres in 1991. By 2001 this percentage
had dropped to 36% (Heffner 2004). This in turn has put pressure on academic med-
15 Commercialisation of scientific research is a much broader trend and not confined to medical research.
See for instance Krimsky (2003), Mirowski and Sent (2002), Wilholt (2006), and Carrier (2008).
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ical centres to compete with the for-profit organisations. In response, several leading
universities have formed networks. Today, two thirds of academic medical centres
hold equity in start-ups that sponsor some of the research conducted in these centres
(Bekelman et al. 2003).
3.2.4 Profits and patents
The pharmaceutical industry makes exorbitant profits with margins that are much
higher than those of other industries. In the 1990s, the top-ten pharmaceutical com-
panies had a profit margin of about 25% of sales while the industry average was
about 3–5% (Public Citizen 2003). In the Fortune 500 list, pharma was, with a profit
margin of 19.1%, still the second most profitable industry in 2008, topped only by
mining/crude-oil production.16
Above-average profits are likely to be due to the monopoly power companies have
over selling their inventions. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) grants
20-year patents to inventor firms, in the form of a patent and the FDA exclusive mar-
keting rights. The 20-year period is reduced by the time it takes the company to run
clinical trials and get FDA approval such that effective patent life is about 14 years
(Public Citizen 2001, 16). However, companies can stretch that period considerably
in a variety of ways. For instance, if a branded drug manufacturer sues a generics
company for patent infringement, FDA approval of the generic drug will be automat-
ically delayed by 30 months—even if there is no basis for the case. So-called ‘citizen
petitions’ can be filed in which safety concerns about a generic are raised, which can
also delay approval. Further, if a drug is tested in children an additional 6 months
of protection is granted. This often results in drugs being tested in children even if
the drug treats adult diseases such as high blood pressure. And since every aspect
of a drug can be patented, including new uses, dosage forms, combinations of old
drugs, coatings and colours of pills, patent thickets are created around new substances
(Angell 2004, Ch. 10).
4 Existing proposals for a solution
I will briefly consider three existing proposals to reform BMR. The first, developed by
the political philosopher Thomas Pogge, is motivated mainly by concerns for global
justice. As explained above, global justice is just one facet of the problems relevant
here. Nevertheless it is the most detailed reform plan there is to date, and it brings out
some ideas important for appreciating my own alternative.
Pogge’s proposal is based on three main ideas (Pogge 2005; Hollis and Pogge 2008).
First, inventor firms should be rewarded with a 10-year monopoly on their inventions
after market approval. Second, during this time they are rewarded, out of public funds,
in proportion to the impact of their invention on the global disease burden. Third,
the cost of this scheme is borne by the governments of advanced countries. The idea
is to make essential medicines available to all by keeping their prices low while at
16 See money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/.
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the same time providing financial incentives for companies to invent drugs that target
conditions that have a high disease burden, no matter where they obtain.
Pogge’s proposal focuses on the moral failings and only the moral failings of current
BMR. It aims to realign research priorities of U.S. pharmaceutical companies with the
plights of the global poor. Supposing that the measures he envisages are successful,
the proposal neglects the other dimensions of shortcomings. Specifically:
• Since it basically retains the current intellectual-property system—accepting the
view that without it there would be no or considerably less innovation—it also
retains the negative effects of that system. As I will explain in detail below, the
existence of monopolies tends to induce rent-seeking behaviour such as the cre-
ation of legal thickets around patents, corruption and aggressive marketing, and
there is no reason to believe that there should be any less rent-seeking in Pogge’s
scheme than in the current system.
• The current system is economically inefficient, a fact mirrored in high health care
costs. In Pogge’s scheme the inefficiency is likely to be maintained because it cre-
ates a dual system with the newly created health impact fund existing alongside
traditional patent protection.
• The current system is skewed towards patentable solutions: drugs, gadgets, forms
of administering treatments and so on. But many effective solutions are not
patentable because they involve for instance environmental approaches. Unpat-
entable solutions would remain neglected—a moral and socio-economic short-
coming.
• A system in which innovators are rewarded with a monopoly on their inventions
provides incentives to hide research results. No idea is ever entirely new and
always builds upon earlier ideas (see below discussion on ‘innovation chains’).
Medical research is strongly characterised by this feature. It has already been
mentioned that pharmaceutical companies almost always develop entities that
originate elsewhere, mostly in basic research done at universities. Pogge’s sys-
tem would therefore perpetuate an epistemic shortcoming.
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel-prize winning economist, proposes a similar solution with
four elements (Stiglitz 2006a, Ch. 4, 2006b):
(1) Introducing separate intellectual property regimes for different levels of devel-
opment;
(2) Provision of drugs at cost to developing countries;
(3) Compelling innovating firms to provide licenses to (third-world) generics pro-
ducers in the case of lifesaving drugs;
(4) Creating a Medical Prize Fund (from public and philanthropic money).
Since Stiglitz’ plan also leaves the current IP regime basically untouched, most of the
criticisms of Pogge’s proposal carry over. In particular, it is hard to see how pharma-
ceutical companies could be motivated to invent life-saving drugs to treat third-world
diseases (rather than continuing to develop products that sell in the U.S.) unless the
expected profit from doing so is at least as high as the expected profit from the projects
currently pursued. But that means that the Medical Prize Fund must award artificially
high prizes—and is therefore socio-economically inefficient.
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Philosopher of science James Robert Brown opts for a more radical reform of the
system. In his proposal, which he calls ‘scientific socialism’, there are two major
changes relative to the current regime (Brown 2008, 209): (a) elimination of patents
in the domain of medical research; (b) adjustment of public funding to appropriate
levels. Brown’s proposal is motivated by the desire to eliminate the adverse effects of
research driven by commercial interests. Replacing a system that is dominantly mar-
ket-driven by one that is exclusively public-driven might not bring about the desired
change, however. Among other things, government-funded research does not have
great precedents to speak for it. Some of the more recent changes that commercialised
BMR have been introduced because the then-status quo in which the government
occupied a larger role was seen as inadequate. The Bayh-Dole Act, for instance, was
passed because of the 30,000 patents the government had amassed by the late 1970s,
only 5% were commercially licensed. The fruits of publicly sponsored research were
therefore of no use to the general public.
5 A Millian alternative
I call the proposal I am going to describe in what follows (aspects of which were
developed in a joint work with Philip Kitcher; see Reiss and Kitcher 2009) ‘Millian’
because it stresses the importance of individuality, it takes pluralism as an epistemic
norm and it is committed to social progress and the protection of minority interests.
The proposal has the following four components: changes in the IP regime; creation of
an independent clinical research institute; aligning innovators’ and patients’ interests;
and additional regulation. Let us consider each in turn.
5.1 The intellectual property regime
I agree with Brown that the most important aspect of regulation that has to be changed
in order to address the failings of current BMR is the system of intellectual property
(IP) protection. Rather than enabling innovation—as standard economic theory pre-
dicts—we have good reasons to believe that patent-induced monopolies cause (a) the
stifling of innovation because of innovation chains (every new idea is built on a previ-
ous idea, and if the previous idea is protected, the new idea cannot be developed); (b)
redundant research; and (c) rent-seeking behaviour (Boldrin and Levine 2008, Ch. 9).
All three consequences are prominent in U.S. BMR. To give just one example of how
patents can stifle innovation, consider a statement by Peter Ringrose, chief scientific
officer at Bristol-Myers: ‘there are more than 50 proteins possibly involved in cancer
that the company was not working on because the patent holders either would not
allow it or were demanding unreasonable royalties’ (Pollack 2001). That many ‘new’
drugs that are approved for marketing aren’t genuinely new and therefore to a large
extent redundant has been described above.
Let me explain the third point about the connection between monopolies and rent-
seeking in slightly greater detail. A monopolist charges a higher price for his good
(which he can because he is its sole supplier) and therefore reap a higher profit than
an otherwise identical firm in a competitive structure. The difference between the two
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profit levels is called the monopoly rent. Monopoly rents produce incentives to engage
in non-economic behaviour such as attempts to keep potential competitors out of the
market or to protect the monopoly through favourable legislation. This kind of behav-
iour is called rent-seeking. Examples of typical rent-seeking behaviour that have been
observed in U.S. BMR are excessive advertising and marketing, corruption, lobbying,
the creation of patent thickets and so on.
Plainly, that strong IP protection can cause the stifling of innovation, redundant
research and rent-seeking does not entail that this is the factor that is responsible for
these facts about current BMR nor that moderating IP is an effective strategy to combat
them. The former—historical—question is one that lies neither within the topic nor
the scope of this paper. So let us look at the question concerning effective strategies.
We learn from Mill—in his utilitarian moments—that social institutions need to
be adapted to the time, place and context where they operate. The institution of IP
is no exception. As mentioned above, economists sometimes argue that IP must be
protected because without protection nobody would invest in the production of ideas.
But, as we also learn from Mill, such a claim is at best true ‘in the abstract’: if actors
are motivated only by greed and if no disturbing factors operate. A disturbing factor
that has been shown to make a difference is time: in mathematical models in which
copying an idea takes time, there can be innovation without IP protection (Boldrin
and Levine 2002). Another crucial factor is the demand elasticity of the new product
(ibid.). Since this is likely to be different for different industries (in particular different
within the spectrum of medical products; for example, different for life-saving than
for lifestyle medicines), there is no reason to believe that an optimal IP regime is the
same for all countries and all times but even within a country and at a point in time
for all industries.
Because of the complexity of the matter and because so little is known empirically
(though for a beginning, see Boldrin and Levine 2008), to my mind the right way to
approach the question is by ‘adaptive management’. Sandra Mitchell explains the idea
as follows (Mitchell 2009, 97):
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important thing to notice about adap-
tive management is that it modifies the predict-and-act model to be an iterative
process of predict, act, establish metrics of successful action, gather data about
consequences, predict anew, establish metrics of successful action, act, gather
data about consequences, predict anew…. Adaptive management is a dynamic,
iterative, feedback-rich strategy for decision making that matches the dynamic,
feedback-dependent reality of complex systems.
Rather than introducing a new system in one fell swoop, as Pogge,17 Stiglitz and Brown
propose, adaptive management suggests a piecemeal approach: (1) gradually reduce
patent duration and/or breadth,18 (2) observe consequences on innovation, profits and
17 David Levine has told me in personal conversation that he is sceptical about scheme’s such as Pogge’s
precisely because we don’t know what the consequences will be.
18 By breadth I mean the range of ideas that are considered worthy of patent protection. One of the most
glaring examples of currently excessive breadth is the patenting of turmeric for the use of wound healing.
See Anuradha (2001).
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rent-seeking behaviour, and (3) assess whether (a) the intervention improved on the
status quo and (b) a satisfactory outcome has been reached. If the answer to (a) is yes
but to (b) no, go back to (1). If the answer to (a) is no, redesign the intervention on the
basis of what has been learned and go back to (1). Stop this circle once the answer to
(b) is yes but continue to monitor the crucial outcome parameters (innovation, profits
and rent-seeking behaviour).
The pivotal question is what should count as a ‘satisfactory outcome’. With respect
to any single parameter, an optimum should be relatively easy to determine. Suppose
there is indeed a causal relationship between patent life and the rate of innovation.19
Holding fixed other causes of innovations, changing patent life should then change
the rate of innovation. Once the functional relationship between the two variables has
been determined empirically, the function can be maximised with respect to patent life,
and patent life fixed at the optimum length. There is no guarantee, of course, that the
optimum for the rate of innovation coincides with the optimum for other parameters
such as profits (optimum outcome = average rate of return for the given level of risk)
or the different forms of rent-seeking (optimum outcome = zero). A compromise must
be sought and therefore I speak of a ‘satisfactory outcome’.
5.2 Independent clinical testing
Whereas the reform of the IP system focuses primarily on the social failures—needless
pseudo-innovations and rent-seeking—a reform of the clinical testing apparatus is due
because of its epistemic shortcomings. The root of the problem here is, to put it bluntly,
that the same people who are responsible for a pharmaceutical company’s profits are
also responsible for drug testing and reporting research results. It is not surprising that
not everyone facing these conflicts of interest acts in a way that promotes patients’
welfare.
The problem of disentangling patients’ and commercial interests can be approached
from various angles. Justin Biddle proposes that the FDA adopt an adversarial system
for drug approvals (Biddle 2007, 34):
Under this system, two groups of advocates would argue before a panel of judges
over such questions as whether—and under what conditions—a drug should be
allowed on the market, and whether a drug that is already on the market should
remain so. One set of advocates would consist of industry or industry-sponsored
scientists who would argue on behalf of a pharmaceutical company. The other
set would consist of scientists who receive no funding from pharmaceutical com-
panies; these advocates would argue on behalf of the public that, for example, a
given drug is sufficiently dangerous that it should be taken off the market. The
panel of judges could consist, for example, of FDA or university scientists who
are independent of any industry that might have a stake in the outcome of the
proceedings.
19 To keep matters simple and straight. The quality of the innovations matters too of course. More on that
below in Sect. 5.3.
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Enacting Biddle’s proposal would probably constitute an improvement over the current
situation but it cannot solve even the epistemic problem all by itself. The ‘scientists
who receive no funding from pharmaceutical companies’ could at best point to flaws
in the drug companies’ reasoning. Even that would be difficult as long as the data con-
tinue to be provided by industry, which, in an adversarial system, has every motivation
to present its case in a favourable light. Absent additional clinical trials, the public’s
advocates could not provide independent reasons in favour or against approving a
drug.
Apart from the need for funding, the possible sources of which Biddle does not
discuss, conducting additional trials would lead into a dilemma. The advocates of
the public will either, as in a genuine adversarial system and like the pharmaceutical
companies, manipulate aspects of trial design such as to make favourable outcomes
likely and filter results or conduct the trials and report outcomes in a neutral manner.
If they do the former, it will be virtually impossible for the judges to come to the right
conclusion: two bad pieces of evidence don’t make a good one. If they do the latter,
conducting also industry trials would seem wasteful.
I therefore see no other solution than to leave the running of clinical trials to an
independent body committed to neutral hypothesis testing and overlooked by a board
whose members represent different stakeholders. Funding could be either fully public
(as Brown proposes) or by membership fees—every organisation that seeks to test a
new drug has to pay a fee that is independent of the number and outcomes of the trials
conducted by the institute (see Reiss and Kitcher 2009) or by a mix of the two.20 As
long as financial independence and quality control of clinical testing is guaranteed,
it does not matter in principle whether the actual trials are conducted by university
researchers or the members of a centralised ‘Institute for Clinical Trials’. Some con-
siderations point to favouring a more centralised approach. After the Bayh-Dole Act,
university research itself has become commercialised, and many academics see them-
selves as partners of industry rather than pursuers of an independent good (Krimsky
2003). University research and entrepreneurship are entangled, for instance by per-
sonal financial ties of academics to industry and university medical centres owning
equity in businesses (Bekelman et al. 2003). At least as things stand today, university
researchers may not be the best choice if independence from industry is the goal. More-
over, centralising clinical research would help enforcing quality standards as well as
making them subject to public scrutiny. On the other hand, as long as there is disagree-
ment regarding the precise nature of the standards, and there is good reason to believe
that at least some controversies (such as that between frequentists and Bayesians) are
here to stay, a pluralist approach with many independent though regulated trial centres
may be preferable. As usual, there is no ideal solution.
Whether independent clinical research constitutes an improvement over the status
quo can be determined relatively easily. The goal is to be in the position to know a
new treatment’s safety and efficacy prior to approval. While it is clear that we can
never know for certain that this goal has been reached, there are simple metrics of suc-
20 The new system could be combined with an adversarial drug approval process, which, for instance,
takes into account further evidence and determines whether the evidence indicates that the drug is socially
valuable.
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cess. When for instance phase-IV trials (so-called post-marketing surveillance trials)
continue to contradict phase-III trials (i.e., large pre-approval trials), and in particular
when differences are noticeable soon after approval (such as in the Vioxx case, see
Biddle 2007), we know that something went wrong.
5.3 Aligning commercial and (global) patients’ incentives
Above I have argued that the status quo is morally deficient because drugs that come
to the market often (a) are no better than current drugs, (b) target conditions that either
need no treatment or for which there are alternative, non-medical treatments available,
and (c) neglect the diseases of the poor. Problems (a) and (b) can be ameliorated if not
solved by stricter approval requirements. As already discussed, currently a drug has to
be shown to be effective only relative to a placebo except in cases where it would be
highly unethical not to treat patients. Instead, the FDA should require drugs to have
genuine medical benefits, that is, to be better than all existing therapies, including
non-medical options.
The problem of neglected diseases requires additional government action. Reiss
and Kitcher (2009) advocate the creation of ‘Global Institutes of Health’, in analogy
with the U.S. National Institutes of Health but committed to addressing global health
issues. But direct funding of research projects would only be one means to incen-
tivise neglected-disease research. So-called advance purchase commitments (APCs,
also known as advance market commitments or AMCs) are another, and so are awards
and tax breaks for research into neglected diseases.21 Adaptive management can be
used to determine which of the different measures promotes global health outcomes
most efficiently and effectively.
5.4 Additional stricter regulation
While the remodelling of the IP system should result in a reduction in rent-
seeking activity on part of the pharmaceutical companies, the reform can be supported
by outlawing—and enforcing the ban on—certain unfavourable practises. There is
no reason why pharmaceuticals should be advertised to patients, so DTC advertis-
ing should be prohibited. Moreover, the various ways in which drug companies lure
doctors into prescribing their medications can and should be blocked. This concerns
industry sponsorship of continuing education events, advertising in medical journals,
direct payments, for example in the form of consulting fees, gifts and dinners as well
as ‘finders’ fees’. In the new system there will be much less incentive for drug compa-
nies to engage in these activities. Nevertheless, prohibiting what is not prohibited now
and enforcing existing regulation provides an additional signal that these practises are
socially harmful.
21 This is also a type of mechanism Matthias Adam advocates: ‘A reward system that places a particular
premium on the investigation of neglected research topics might be capable of securing a balanced and
comprehensive scientific research program while allowing scientists or research groups to follow their own
preferences’ (Adam 2008, 238–239).
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6 Conclusion
This paper began by arguing that the organisation of biomedical research should be a
philosophy of science topic. I made the case by pointing out how more traditional phi-
losophy of science issues such as that of theory choice and choice of research projects
are intertwined with issues that are more traditionally dealt with in ethics, for instance
patient welfare and global justice. The proposal outlined here too shows how solutions
affect the epistemic, moral and socio-economic dimensions at the same time. Most
importantly, less patent protection means lower profits, which means smaller rents
to be sought, which means less incentives to ‘cheat’ when it comes to establishing
whether or not a drug is safe and effective. Likewise, requiring drugs to be tested
against an existing treatment is not only an epistemic standard but a social one in that
it makes socially inefficient ‘invention’ less likely.
Let me emphasise that the specific proposal outlined here is at best a rough sketch
of a reform. Some of the empirical facts one would need to know in order to give
more detailed recommendations, especially regarding optimal IP regimes, are simply
not well enough understood. But what we can tell with reasonable certainty is that
the current system is deficient, epistemically, morally and socio-economically. I have
tried to defend a specific proposal I believe to be more convincing than some existing
proposals. But more important is that if philosophy of science is to be more socially
relevant, it should be concerned with issues of the kind raised in this paper.
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